

Tomasz R. SZYMCZYŃSKI

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Democratic deficit in the European Union between rhetoric and hermeneutics¹

Abstract: Multidimensionality and dynamics of the European integration process generate almost continuous requirement for adaptation and improvement of its understanding. The situation remains similar in reference to the specific inspection(s) of this process known as a democratic deficit in the European Union. This concept at its general level consists of two highly ambiguous labels: democracy and European Union. On the one hand, the concept of *democracy* with its almost two and half thousand years of history may be easily presented as a typical “umbrella term” with plenty of strong connotations and lack of one clear unequivocal denotation. On the other hand, the notion of *European Union* perhaps only seems to be less controversial. The foremost source of ambiguities in this respect comes from the fact, that the concept of the EU is directly connected with the notion of *supranationality* – fundamental idea functioning as a basis for specificity of European integration process, which may be interpreted as a source of constant challenges of a definitional character both for theoreticians and practitioners of the process. Problems with defining crucial aspects of the European integration process lead to problems of an identity kind. In other words, definitional and identificational challenges maintain in a strong mutual interdependence. In this case hermeneutical point of view helps to set in order this complex matter by proposing the list of issues directly connected with the challenge of adequate interpretation of it. Additionally, the rhetorical aspect of such a challenge is incorporated into the proposed perspective.

Key words: democratic deficit in the EU, supranationality, Hans-Georg Gadamer, rhetoric, hermeneutics of multilinguisticity

As long as it is assumed that the aim of specific practices of transmitting opinions and views – presented always through linguistic forms – is the attempt of reasonable depiction of them towards the other participants of discourses, then a need for agreeing on the meanings of contents

¹ This article has been written within the research project: *The European Union in the Face of the Intensive Development of the People's Republic of China (Unia Europejska wobec przyspieszonego rozwoju Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej)* – financed by the National Science Center in Poland; 2013/11/B/HSS/03572.

hidden behind words and terms becomes rather clear. In other words, no serious controversies should arouse from the thesis, that adequate understanding of concepts applied within such discourses of widely understood political field – both in scientific and popular kind – constitutes an introductory condition for communicative results expected there. However, assent to such a postulate often does not indicate consensus of opinions how this may be achieved in practice.

From that point of view, the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) offers a greatly promising proposal of taking a stance on the indicated dilemma. Application of Gadamer's optics highly increases the probability of crossing barriers of communication, that frequently result from differences in initial suppositions (Szymczyński, 2003, p. 399). In the same time at least three fundamental assumptions ought to be underlined.

Firstly, one needs to distinguish between philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and other possible projects labelled as hermeneutics. Secondly, in front of sometimes posed question towards Gadamer's proposal – is it rather method or theory? – it is important to respond, that a question constructed in such a way to a large extent misses the point, as the hermeneutics of Gadamer ought to be seen much more as a general perspective, or perhaps point of start of reflection devoted to any specified phenomenon of human existence. Thirdly, two above mentioned assumptions lead to underline the mutual relation between rhetorical and hermeneutical. For adequate understanding of any possible narration related to human beings it is crucial to tell again, that Gadamer's exertion of rehabilitation of colloquial speech for philosophical reflection brought into light the frequently hidden mutual influence of such informal and formal types of narrations. Simultaneously, it is perhaps appropriate example indicating that plenty of critiques aimed at the author of *Truth and method* are based on oversimplified reception of his ideas. In this respect it is the postulate of rehabilitation of everyday narrations that opens a possibility of recognition, that the colloquial usage of the term: "rhetoric" is in most cases improperly brought only to its pejorative meaning, which not only affects the common sense picture of that reaching ancient times art, but as well provokes inadequate standpoints on the role and place of rhetoric both within the field of political and of political science (Szymczyński, 2017, pp. 219–232).

The first assumption helps to avoid misreadings arising from frequently made incorrect conjecture that all authors profiling themselves as

hermeneutists necessarily represent the same set of suppositions, which could be described as a singular school of thought, or perhaps as a paradigm. The second offers unique opportunity for academics of maintaining the possibility of applying other specific methods and theories at the later stages of the research process. Considering hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer as a general perspective, or perhaps as a metatheory may simultaneously serve as a key argument for applying it to the challenges of better understanding of the issue of the multifaceted character, which gained the label of the democratic deficit in the European Union.

Multidimensionality and dynamics of the European integration process generate almost continuous requirement for adaptation and improvement of our understanding of it. The situation remains similar in reference to the specific inspection(s) of this process known as a democratic deficit in the European Union. This concept, which most probably was coined by British political scientist, David Marquand (Mény, 2002; Marquand, 1979) raises variety of controversies, which are present as well within academic as within political and administrative fields. Therefore, it is perhaps worthy to begin with noticing that this concept at its general level consists of two highly ambiguous labels: democracy and European Union.

On the one hand, the concept of *democracy* with its almost two and half thousand years of history may be easily presented as a typical “umbrella term” with plenty of strong connotations and lack of one clear unequivocal denotation. On the other hand, the notion of *European Union* perhaps only seems to be less controversial. The foremost source of ambiguities in this respect comes from the fact, that the concept of the European Union (or slightly less formally; *European integration process*) is directly connected with the concept of *supranationality* – fundamental idea functioning as a basis for specificity of European integration process (Szymczyński, 2013, pp. 95–108), which may be interpreted as a source of constant challenges of a definitional character both for theoreticians and practitioners of the process (Szymczyński, 2011, p. 51). Problems with defining crucial aspects of the European integration process lead to problems of an identity kind. In other words, definitional and identificational challenges maintain in a strong mutual interdependence.

Supranational aspect of the European integration project results in difficulties with maintaining traditional distinction between clearly internal (characteristic for sovereign nation states) and evidently external affairs (characteristic for international relations). At the academic level

it is reflected by the challenges of mutual delimitations between Political Science and International Relations, and the discussion over the need of establishing a novel discipline – European Studies as well. From the academic level perspective it directly leads to the questions inside the fields of politics, law and identity. It is important to acknowledge that the supranational shape of the European Union ought to be seen as a primary source of controversies connected with the EU democratic deficit.

In this case hermeneutical point of view helps to set in order this complex matter by proposing the list of questions directly connected with the challenge of adequate interpretation of this issue. At the beginning recognition of the difference between the EU democratic deficit understood as a phenomenon and EU democratic deficit perceived as a concept is desirable. Furtherly, distinction between (1.) state-centric and (2.) union/community-centric perspective is significant. The former (ad 1.) raise questions about democratic standards present inside EU member states (1.1.) and about the influence of EU membership on the quality of democracy inside EU member states (1.2.). In this context probably most often raised problem is potential imbalance of the separation of powers at the state level, which is interpreted as a result of additional strengthening of the member states executive powers by their position in EU institutions.

The latter perspective (ad 2.) begins with the binary distinction between those who claim that there is no democratic deficit in the EU at all (2.1.) and those who present opposite opinion (2.2.). Probably most recognisable scholars representing the first option (ad 2.1.) are Andrew Moravcsik and Giandomenico Majone, whereas among supporters of the thesis of existence of it (ad 2.2.) one should not forget at least about Richard Bellamy, Dimitris N. Chrysochoou, as well as Andreas Føllesdal and Simon Hix among many others (Moravcsik, 2002; Majone, 1998; Bellamy, 2006; Chrysochoou, 2007; Føllesdal and Hix 2006).

Inside the union/community-centric perspective that recognises the existence of the democratic deficit in EU (ad 2.2.) there is significant difference between legal-institutional optics (2.2.1.) and socio-psychological one (2.2.2.). The first (ad 2.2.1.) focuses on the status and shape of EU law (formerly EC law) with a special emphasis on the relations between it and member states law (2.2.1.1.) and on the status, shape and potential reforms of EU institutions (2.2.1.2.). The second (ad 2.2.2.) concentrates its attention on the challenges connected with the European collective identity, and therefore on the questions about the condition of the European demos, European collective heritage, presence and future, as well

as multilingualism and multilinguisticity of the European integration project.

Presented here uncomfortably modest proposal of distinction of variety of possible optics towards EU democratic deficit needs to be perceived through the viewpoint of Max Weber's ideal types conception. For example, the challenges connected with projects of differentiated EU (where the EMU EU Policy with the Euro currency may serve as a prominent case) may be located inside state-centric (1.) and union/community-centric (2.) perspectives, as well as inside legal-institutional (2.2.1.) and socio-psychological (2.2.2.) optics.

One of the consequences of a hermeneutical kind that appears here is that it is constantly significant not to forget to underline the importance of preliminary distinction between concept and phenomenon. It is our daily-based conviction – which after Ancient Greeks may be labelled: *δόξα* (*doxa*) – that repeatedly tries to assure us that what constitutes our personal vision of the world ought to be the universal vision in the same time. It seems, that in reality it is surely slightly more complicated. It appears in the same time that this consequence may be interpreted as a one of possible conclusions drawn from one of the most influential statements of the creator of philosophical hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer, when he in his *opus magnum* pointed out that: “Being that can be understood is language” (Gadamer, 2006, p. 470), which in original version is articulated in this way: „Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache“ (Gadamer, 1986, p. 478).

It is here worthy to remark, that above mentioned ancient Greek *δόξα* (*doxa*) – which etymologically may be derived from *δοκέω* (*dokeo*) implicating: “to seem”, “to think”, with a feminine suffix: *-ιά* (*ia*) – may be translated as “expectation”, “opinion”, “judgement”, “belief”, or “glory” and “honor”. As it has its specific meaning within religious vocabulary, in the same time *δόξα* (*doxa*) has been frequently collated with *ἐπιστήμη* (*episteme*) as its antithesis. Such a contrast between the former understood as “belief” or “opinion” and the latter understood as “objective knowledge” may suggest rather non-problematic access to a clear boundary between that what is based on popular believes and colloquial understandings, and that what ought to be purely scientific. Eventually, more or less implicitly perhaps, such an access to what is ostensible and what is certain.

In this context it is reasonable to emphasize that this division is based on specific initial assumptions most probably rooted in the culture of Greek antiquity. Above all, there is a belief in the unity and totality of

science, or philosophy, or – as it was denoted during these ancient times – dialectics. Not only was there not yet a separation between humanities, social and natural sciences. What is at least equally important, is a presence of set of dominating convictions that were implying what Isaiah Berlin describes as the “Platonic ideal”, which he explains in three points:

“At some point I realised that what all these views had in common was a Platonic ideal: in the first place that, as in the sciences, all genuine questions must have one true answer and one only, all the rest being necessarily errors; in the second place that there must be a dependable path towards the discovery of these truths; in the third place that the true answers, when found, must necessarily be compatible with one another and form a single whole, for one truth cannot be incompatible with another – that we knew a priori. This kind of omniscience was the solution of the cosmic jigsaw puzzle. In the case of morals, we could then conceive what the perfect life must be, founded as it would be on a correct understanding of the rules that governed the universe” (Berlin, 2013, p. 6).

Apart from the influence of ancient Greece on the Western civilization, among most crucial deductions resulting from this observation, is the fact that if Isaiah Berlin – as he himself admits – reached this conclusion only during his own research process, it can be reasonably asked, whether consciousness that the above ideals can only be described as being in the sphere of unachievable desire, is contemporarily univocally recognised?

Raising the question of the struggle of contemporary humanistic and social sciences with a specific form of their own tradition brings the view, that it is reasonable to accept the assumption, that it is at the moment of conceptual separation of *doxa* and *episteme* that the paths of a common sense and scientific approach diverge for a very long time. As Stefan Amsterdamski emphasizes: “[...] what European science inherited from its Greek ancestors was a requirement of a special kind of rationality – the requirement of proof, that what is there, not only is there, but has to be there” (Amsterdamski, 1999, pp. 21–22). This type of requirement – especially since Renaissance – was within Western culture combined with the strong conviction that the human cognitive abilities allow to reach objectivity. It is only in the achievements of Friedrich Nietzsche that Western philosophy began to submit the above theses to doubt (Amsterdamski, 1999, p. 22).

And it is not by accident that as well therefore the author of *Also sprach Zarathustra* is frequently considered as the founding father of modern hermeneutics. Hermeneutics denoted here not simply as an art

of interpretation or just an art of understanding, but rather as an art of understanding of understanding or an art of interpretation of interpretation. This ought to be underlined, because it manifests that it is not just a purely subjective interpretation appearing along with “everything goes” attitude, but rather an optic to some extent similar to that of Max Weber and his famous postulate of freedom of valuation (known in English as well as: “postulate of value freedom” and “postulate of value neutrality” [Germ.: *das Wertfreiheitspostulat*]). While the German sociologist focused more on investigations in relation to the meaning of individual actions, the optics based on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics draws attention to the presence of meaning in the dimension of expression, and therefore in the optics of rhetoric and hermeneutics. In both cases, however, it is about reflexive self-awareness, and again Gadamerian point of view approaches the Weberian postulate of freedom of valuation, although in the latter case it is primarily at the level of communication. Additionally, both perspectives are not free from controversies and both as well are aimed to challenge assumptions characteristic for the natural science at the field for scientific, methodological and philosophical inquires devoted to human beings. Author of the *Truth and method* underlines: “Heightening the tension between truth and method had in my work a polemical intent. Ultimately, as Descartes himself realised, it belongs to the special structure of straightening something crooked that it needs to be bent in the opposite direction. But what was crooked in this case was not so much the methodology of the sciences as their reflexive self-consciousness” (Gadamer, 2006, p. 559).²

Referring to the third assumption of this paper, one shall not omit that while rhetoric (Greek: *ρητορική*) already existed in ancient Greece as an independent discipline of inquiry, establishing the origins of this kind of status in relation to hermeneutics should be considered as highly problematic. Jean Grondin indicates that hermeneutics (Latin: *hermeneutica*) – as a term that would be understood as such a discipline of inquiry or the art of interpretation (interpretation, explanation) – emerged only in the seventeenth century. Therefore, it is justified to talk about its “prehis-

² “Die Zuschärfung der Spannung von Wahrheit und Methode hatte in meinen Untersuchungen einen polemischen Sinn. Am Ende gehört es, wie selbst Descartes anerkennt, zu der besonderen Struktur des Zurechtbiegens eines verbogenen Dinges, daß man es nach der Gegenrichtung beugen muß. Verbogen aber war das Ding – nicht so sehr die Methodik der Wissenschaften als ihr reflexives Selbstbewußtsein” (Gadamer, 1993, p. 453).

tory” (German: *die Vorgeschichte*), within which its etymology deserves attention. The ancient Greeks used the word *ἐρμηνεύειν* – *hermeneuein*, which meant for them both a “statement” and “interpretation”, and synonyms – such as *ἐρμηνευτική* – *hermeneutike*, *ἐρμηνεία* – *hermeneia*, *ἐρμηνεύς* – *hermeneus*, *ἐρμηνῆς τῶν θεῶν* – *hermenes ton theon*, or: *ἐρμηνέων ἐρμηνῆς* – *hermeneon hermenes* – can be found in many of Plato’s dialogues. In turn, the text devoted to the question of true and false sentences of Aristotle entitled: *Περὶ ἐρμηνείας* – *Peri hermeneias* was encapsulated in Latin as *De interpretatione*, while the dissertation of his pupil, Demetrius of Faleron (c. 350–283 BC) with the same Greek title: *Περὶ ἐρμηνείας* – *Peri hermeneias* has been translated into Latin as: *De elocutione* (Grondin, 1993; Grondin, 2001).

Then Jean Grondin, Gadamer’s student and continuator from Canada, begins his reflections on the etymological sources of the meaning of the term “hermeneutics” (Grondin, 1993; Grondin, 2001; Grondin, 2007) with reaching the ancient Greek word *ἐρμηνεύειν* – *hermeneuein* and in reference to the findings made by Gerhard Ebeling (1959), he points to its three elementary directions of meaning (German: *die Bedeutungsrichtungen*):

- a) expression (utterance, speaking), (German: *ausdrücken (aussagen, sprechen)*; Polish: *wyrażanie (wypowiadanie, mówienie)*);
- b) explication (interpretation, explanation), (German: *auslegen (interpretieren, erklären)*; Polish: *wykładnia (interpretowanie, objaśnianie)*);
- c) translation (acting as an interpreter), (German: *übersetzen (dolmetschen)*; Polish: *przekładanie (tłumaczenie)*).

Afterwards, Grondin indicates the semantic proximity of (ad b) “interpretation” and (ad c) “translation”, thus he links these two directions into one: “interpreting”. Next, the Canadian hermeneutist concludes that also in the case of (ad a) “expressing” and (ad b + ad c) “interpreting”, the platform of similarity is revealed, because in both cases the problem (ad a + ad b + ad c) may be designated as “understanding”. Referring to the findings of Jean Pépin (1988, p. 724), Grondin specifies that in the case of “expression” it is about the direction “outwards”, while “interpreting” focuses on re-assimilating what was previously articulated:

“In case of both directions, it is about an understanding or reveal of meaning. The expression reveals an “inside”, while the interpretation seeks (back) the inner meaning behind the expressed. It is therefore advisable to distinguish between a rhetorical and manifestly hermeneutical exposure of meaning: while the first directs itself outwards, the other vice versa runs from the expressed into its inner content or

– to avoid psychological narrowing – into that, what an expression wishes to communicate (meaning of content).”³

This statement of Jean Grondin brings us into the important remark, that hermeneutics and rhetoric ought to be interpreted as two major pillars of the art of understanding. In the same time such a perspective refers directly to the words of Hans-Georg Gadamer:

“The ubiquity of rhetoric, indeed, is unlimited. [...] There can be no doubt, then, about the fundamental function of rhetoric within social life. [...] All science that would wish to be of practical usefulness at all is dependent on it. No less universal is the function of hermeneutics. The lack of immediate understandability of texts handed down to us historically or their proneness to be misunderstood is really only a special case of what is to be met in all human orientation to the world as the *atopon* (the strange), that which does not ‘fit’ into the customary order of our expectation based on experience” (Gadamer, 1977, pp. 24–25⁴).⁵

³ As this part of the text is totally omitted in English language version, which is based on the first edition of Grondin’s book (Grondin, 1993), it seems reasonable to quote both German and Polish versions of it, as both served as a basis for translation made by the author of this paper:

„In beiden Richtungen gehe es also um eine Verständlichmachung oder Sinnvermittlung. Das Aussagen gibt ein „Inneres“ kund, während das Interpretieren den inneren Sinn hinter dem ausgedrückten (zurück)sucht. Es empfiehlt sich also, zwischen einer rhetorischen und einer ausgesprochen hermeneutischen Sinnvermittlung zu unterscheiden: Während die erste ad extra geht, verläuft die andere umgekehrt vom Ausdruck auf seinen „inneren“ Gehalt hin oder – um psychologistische Verengung zu vermeiden – auf das, was ein Ausdruck zu sagen hat (Gehaltsinn)“ (Grondin, 2001, p. 37).

„W przypadku obu kierunków chodzi zatem o rozumienie lub odsłonięcie sensu. Wypowiedź odsłania „to, co wewnętrzne”, podczas gdy interpretowanie poszukuje (na powrót) wewnętrznego sensu poza tym, co wyrażone. Warte zalecenia jest zatem rozróżnianie pomiędzy retorycznym a wyraźnie hermeneutycznym odsłanianiem sensu: podczas gdy pierwsze kieruje się na zewnątrz, drugie przebiega odwrotnie, od wyrazu do jego wewnętrznej treści lub – by uniknąć psychologistycznego zawężenia – do tego, co wyraz ma do powiedzenia (znaczenie)” (Grondin, 2007, p. 31).

⁴ “Die Ubiquität der Rhetorik ist eine unbeschränkte. [...] An ihrer fundamentalen Funktion innerhalb des sozialen Lebens kann kein Zweifel sein. Alle Wissenschaft, welche praktisch werden soll, ist auf sie angewiesen. – Auf der anderen Seite ist die Funktion der Hermeneutik nicht minder universal. Die Unverständlichkeit oder Mißverständlichkeit überlieferter Texte, die sie ursprünglich auf den Plan gerufen hat, ist nur ein Sonderfall dessen, was in aller menschlichen Weltorientierung als das *atopon*, das Seltsame begegnet, das sich in den gewohnten Erwartungsordnungen der Erfahrung nirgends unterbringen läßt.” (Gadamer, 1993, p. 237).

⁵ The title of the text quoted here – which is in German language “Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik” and was published for the first time in 1967 – was

The aim of this text is to emphasise the role the language layer plays within the art of understanding. This refers both to the challenges related to the skills of articulation of specific views or ideas (the area of rhetoric), as well as to the challenges arising from attempts at reception in the form of constant approaching closer to the understanding of such views and ideas (the area of hermeneutics). At the same time, it seems extremely important to emphasize the fact that a hermeneutic understanding of a given message should absolutely not be equated with any necessity of consent with such a message. Of course, the more often it would happen that the explanation of a certain point of view would mean the elimination of controversy, the better. However, such a scenario cannot be expected as necessary, among other reasons as well because of the fact, that in that case it would simply mean optics detached from the conditions of possibility within the social reality. Hans-Georg Gadamer makes us realise that the real conversation is unfortunately a phenomenon that happens relatively rarely. And only then emphasises that this fact should not discourage us from attempting to make it happen.

There is therefore in this respect an important issue for the art of understanding of understanding in general, and in this sense for the humanities and social sciences in particular. Separating the space of understanding of specific different views from the consent with such views is the basic starting point for further exploration of the possibilities of creating space for potential talk in the Gadamerian sense. In other words, at the outset, a hermeneutist should make every effort to get as close as possible to grasping the intentions articulated by a particular interlocutor. On the other hand however, it would be extremely naive, if this postulate always

translated by Richard Palmer and G. B. Hess into English under the title "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection" and appeared in: *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, ed. D. E. Linge, University of California Press, Berkeley 1976, pp. 18–43. Subsequently, it was reprinted in: Josef Bleicher, *Contemporary Philosophy: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy, and Critique*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1980, pp. 128–140; in: *Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur*, eds. G. L. Ormiston, A. D. Schrift, Suny Press, Albany 1990; and this time under the title "Rhetoric, Hermeneutics and Ideology-Critique," in: *Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time: A Reader*, eds. W. Jost, M. Hyde, Yale University Press, New Haven 1997, pp. 313–34. The interesting aspect that may be revealed from this context, is that until 1997 it might have been perhaps difficult to find out, that very famous text of Hans-Georg Gadamer, which served as an important part of his debate with Jürgen Habermas was translated into English already in 1977, however under radically altered title.

meant complete unity of perspectives between the actors involved in the communication process.

And precisely it is here where the standpoint of the creator of philosophical hermeneutics – Hans-Georg Gadamer helps us to underline the mutual interdependency between rhetoric, hermeneutics and the challenges connected with the democratic standards of the European integration process known as a democratic deficit in the European Union. Oversimplified interpretation of relation between skillful understanding and potential consent more and more frequently leads to the cynical and nihilist understanding of the art of articulation and expression. And, last but not least, the specificity of the European Union is not only related to the mentioned above phenomenon of supranationality, but as well to the enormous number of formal languages within this organisation.

It seems that in recent years there has been a lack of time and real willingness to increase the level of mutual understanding of the multilevel institutional system functioning within the EU. Arrangements which, through a reasonable interpretation of the perspectivism presented by Friedrich Nietzsche, and moderate interpretation of Max Weber postulate of freedom of valuation within scientific field could contribute to a better understanding of views on interests and fears, as well as shared values, which additionally take on a different form when they are articulated in different individual languages of Europe.

Bibliography

- Amsterdamski S. (1999), *Nauka. Technika. Etyka* (En: *Science, Technique. Ethics*), in: *Idee a urządzanie świata społecznego. Księga jubileuszowa dla Jerzego Szackiego*, eds. E. Nowicka, M. Chałubiński, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.
- Bellamy R. (2006), *Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation, and Democracy in the EU*, „European Law Journal”, vol. 12, no. 6.
- Berlin I. (2013), *On the Pursuit of the Ideal*, in: *The Crooked Timber of Humanity. Chapters in the History of Ideas*, ed. H. Hardy, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Bleicher J. (1980), *Contemporary Philosophy: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy, and Critique*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
- Chrysochoou D. N. (2007), *Democracy and the European Polity*, in: *European Union Politics*, ed. M. Cini, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Ebeling G. (1959), *Hermeneutik*, in: *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. K. Gallig, vol. III, Tübingen.

- Føllesdal A., Hix S. (2006), *Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik*, „Journal of Common Market Studies”, vol. 44, no. 3.
- Gadamer H.-G. (1976), *On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection* (transl. by G. B. Hess, R. E. Palmer), in: Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, ed. D. E. Linge, University of California Press, Berkeley–Los Angeles–London.
- Gadamer H.-G. (1986), *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, Gesammelte Werke*, vol. I, (En: *Truth and method*), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen.
- Gadamer H.-G. (1993), *Nachwort zur 3. Auflage (1972)*, in: H.-G. Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. II *Hermeneutik II (Wahrheit und Methode: Ergänzungen, Register)*, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2, durchgesehene Auflage, Tübingen.
- Gadamer H.-G. (1993), *Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik: Metakritische Erörterungen zu »Wahrheit und Methode«*, in: H.-G. Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. II (*Hermeneutik II (Wahrheit und Methode: Ergänzungen, Register)*), J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2, durchgesehene Auflage, Tübingen.
- Gadamer H.-G. (1997), *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics and Ideology-Critique*, in: *Rhetoric and Hermeneutics in Our Time: A Reader*, eds. W. Jost, M. Hyde, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Gadamer H.-G. (2003), *Retoryka, hermeneutyka i krytyka ideologii. Metakrytyczne rozważania wokół »Prawdy i metody«*, w: H.-G. Gadamer, *Język i rozumienie*, transl. P. Dehnel, B. Sierocka, Aletheia, Warszawa.
- Gadamer H.-G. (2006), *Truth and Method*, transl. J. Weinsheimer, D. G. Marshall, Continuum, London–New York.
- Grondin J. (1993), *Introduction to philosophical hermeneutics*, foreword by H.-G. Gadamer, transl. by J. Weinsheimer, Yale University Press, New Haven–London.
- Grondin J. (2001), *Einführung in die Philosophische Hermeneutik*, (2., überarbeitete Auflage), Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt.
- Grondin J. (2007), *Wprowadzenie do hermeneutyki filozoficznej*, transl. L. Łysień, Wydawnictwo WAM, Kraków.
- Hordecki B. (2017), *Wokół politycznego wymiaru związków retoryki z logiką*, in: *Powinowactwa retoryki* (En.: *Around the political dimension of relations between rhetoric and logic*, in: *Affinities of rhetoric*), ed. B. Sobczak, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Seria Filologia Polska nr 170, Poznań.
- Januszkiewicz M. (2017), *Hermeneutika i retoryka*, in: *Powinowactwa retoryki* (En.: *Hermeneutics and rhetoric*, in: *Affinities of rhetoric*), ed. B. Sobczak, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Seria Filologia Polska nr 170, Poznań.
- Leśniewski N. (2004), *Retoryka w hermeneutycznym ujęciu H.-G. Gadamera*, in: *Dziedzictwo Gadamera*, ed. A. Przyłębski, Humaniora, Poznań.

- Lichański J. Z. (2017), *Przedwczesna śmierć retoryki. Wokół użyteczności retoryki dziś*, in: *Powinowactwa retoryki* (En: *The premature death of rhetoric. Around the usefulness of rhetoric today*, in: *Affinities of rhetoric*), ed. B. Sobczak, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Seria Filologia Polska nr 170, Poznań.
- Majone G. (1998), *Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': the Question of Standards*, „*European Law Journal*”, vol. 4, no. 1.
- Marcos A. (2010), *Ciencia y acción. Una filosofía práctica de la ciencia*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México.
- Marcos A. (2012), *Filozofia nauki. Nowe wymiary*, transl. P. Roszak, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń.
- Marquand D. (1979), *Parliament for Europe*, Cape, London.
- Mény Y. (2002), *De la démocratie en Europe: Old Concepts and New Challenges*, „*Journal of Common Market Studies*”, vol. 41, no. 1.
- Moravcsik A. (2002), *In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union*, „*Journal of Common Market Studies*”, vol. 40, no. 4.
- Ormiston G. L., Schrift A. D. (eds.) (1990), *Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur*, Suny Press.
- Pepin J. (1988), *Hermeneutik*, in: *Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum*, vol. XIV, Stuttgart.
- Schleiermacher F. (1977), *Hermeneutik und Kritik*, ed. M. Frank, Frankfurt am Main.
- Szymczyński T. R. (2011), *Prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej. Teoretyczne i praktyczne aspekty z perspektywy podejścia Pierre'a Bourdieu* (En.: *Presidency in the European Union. Theoretical and practical aspects from the Pierre Bourdieu perspective*), in: *Priorytety prezydencji Polski w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Analiza politologiczna*, eds. Z. Czachór, T. R. Szymczyński, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa.
- Szymczyński T. R. (2013), *Horyzonty sporu wokół istoty zjawiska deficytu demokratycznego w Unii Europejskiej* (En.: *Horizons of contention over the essence of the democratic deficit phenomenon in the European Union*), Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, Warszawa.
- Szymczyński T. R. (2013), *Pojęcie supranarodowości w polu integracji europejskiej z perspektywy hermeneutyki Hansa-Georga Gadamera* (En.: *The concept of supranationality within the field of the European integration from the hermeneutical perspective of Hans-Georg Gadamer*), „*Przegląd Politologiczny*”, no. 4.
- Szymczyński T. R. (2017), *Pytanie o miejsce retoryki w hermeneutyce filozoficznej Hansa-Georga Gadamera*, in: *Powinowactwa retoryki* (En.: *Considering the position of rhetoric within the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, in: *Affinities of rhetoric*), ed. B. Sobczak, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Seria Filologia Polska nr 170, Poznań.

Zgółka T. (2017), *Poprawność językowa w oczach retoryki*, in: *Powinowactwa retoryki* (En.: *Language correctness from a rhetoric point of view*, in: *Affinities of rhetoric*), ed. B. Sobczak, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, Seria Filologia Polska nr 170, Poznań.

Deficyt demokratyczny w Unii Europejskiej między retoryką i hermeneutyką

Summary

Wielowymiarowość i dynamika procesu integracji europejskiej generują niemal ciągle wymóg adaptacji i podwyższania jakości jego rozumienia. Nie inaczej wygląda sytuacja w odniesieniu do konkretnego oglądu tego procesu, który określany jest mianem deficytu demokratycznego w Unii Europejskiej. Ta koncepcja na poziomie ogólnym składa się z dwóch wysoce niejednoznacznych etykiet: demokracja i Unia Europejska. Z jednej strony, pojęcie *demokracji* z prawie dwoma i pół tysiącami lat historii można łatwo przedstawić jako typowy „parasolowy termin” z dużą ilością silnych konotacji i brakiem jednoznacznej denotacji. Z drugiej strony, pojęcie *Unii Europejskiej* okazuje się niemniej kontrowersyjne. Najważniejszym źródłem niejasności w tym względzie jest fakt, że kategoria UE jest bezpośrednio związana z pojęciem *supranarodowości* – zasadniczą ideą funkcjonującą jako podstawa specyfiki procesu integracji europejskiej, którą można interpretować jako źródło stałych wyzwania o charakterze definicyjnym zarówno dla teoretyków, jak i praktyków tego procesu. Problemy z określeniem kluczowych aspektów procesu integracji europejskiej prowadzą do problemów o charakterze identyfikacyjnym. Innymi słowy, wyzwań definicyjne i identyfikacyjne pozostają w silnej wzajemnej zależności. W tym przypadku hermeneutyczny punkt widzenia pomaga uporządkować to złożone zagadnienie, proponując listę kwestii bezpośrednio związanych z wyzwaniem adekwatnej interpretacji tego zagadnienia. Dodatkowo, retoryczny wymiar tego wyzwania został uwzględniony w ramach zaproponowanego ujęcia.

Słowa kluczowe: deficyt demokratyczny w UE, supranarodowość, Hans-Georg Gadamer, retoryka, hermeneutyka wielojęzykowości