

Łukasz DONAJ

Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu

Ukraine After the Parliamentary Elections of 2012: Selected Scenarios of the Development of the Political Situation

Twenty-some years of Ukrainian independence is not enough to build reliable hypotheses about the development of the internal and external situation of the country, however, some assumptions can now be made.¹ This article presents a vision of the development of the political situation in Ukraine that the author thinks will arise—or rather is already—after the parliamentary elections of 2012. This simplified vision will be constructed on the basis of a forecasting method called the global scenario. The article thus cites selected problems of forecasting, especially those related to the method of the global scenario, which is then referred to the political situation in Ukraine.

Forecasting is understood as predicting based on specific trustworthy data. Futurology in turn is the science of predicting the future. The purpose of scientific forecasting is to show a vision (model) of the future in the most probable way that the phenomenon under investigation will develop, including the directions and dynamics of its development. In the course of forecasting, we also aim to determine the conditions for the evolution of the analysed phenomenon. A forecast prepared for this purpose must take account of the known relationships, types, and intensity of external influences and internal changes expected in the development of the phenomenon under investigation.²

¹ See also: Ł. Donaj, *Współczesny kryzys społeczno-polityczny na Ukrainie jako przykład cykliczności (chroniczności?) procesów politycznych*, “Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne” 2005, No. 2.

² The term *forecast* should be understood as a ‘a judgment based on scientific research practices, relating to a specific future, not the future in general; verified empirically; uncertain, yet accepted, or reliable, credible, and plausible.’ Based on: K. J. Stryjski, *Prognozy i symulacje międzynarodowe*, “Studia Międzynarodowe. Zeszyty Naukowe WSSM w Łodzi” 2003, No. 1, p. 1; K. J. Stryjski, *Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe*, Łódź 2004, p. 29; B. Guzik, D. Appenzeller, W. Jurek,

One of the tasks that predicting as a science faces is to fulfil its practical function, which involves, among others, determining the degree of prediction accuracy. The degree inherits prediction from laws derived deductively from statistical laws relating to specific facts. The components of accuracy of this inheritance are both the degree of the certainty of the truth and the contents of causal, coexistential, and statistical laws.³

The forecasting procedure must come from a recognition of the current situation. The diagnosis of this situation should be sufficiently developed to lay down the current phase of its fluctuation and the expected succession of future phases. Scientific prediction performing a practical function requires development diagnosis, also called predictive diagnosis. It involves inquiring about the future development of a given process or phenomenon based on the previous phases of the partial diagnoses (typological, genetic, meaning, and phase) and their findings.⁴

One of the forecasting methods is the **scenario analysis**. It experienced its heyday in the 1970s and was recognized as the primary method of forecasting. The term *scenario* was first used in this context by Herman Kahn. This method is based on the search for factors that may affect the course of events and thus lead to different versions of the future (scenarios). It can be used mainly in situations where the problem is complex, the likelihood of significant changes in the environment of the problem is high, the development of the main trends is difficult to determine, and the time horizon is relatively long.⁵ Scenarios as well as many other analytical tools have military origins and in the loose sense of the word were already used in antiquity. In a more practical sense, scenarios are the basis for

Prognozowanie i symulacje. Wybrane zagadnienia, Poznań 2004, p. 7. See also: Ł. Donaj, *Problems of Forecasting Social Phenomena on the Example of the Method of Global Scenario Analysis*, in: *Технологизация политических процессов в условиях глобализации: теория, опыт, перспективы – Мир и Согласие. Приложение к журналу*, edited by О. Е. Гришин, В. И. Камышанов, Москва 2012.

³ J. Kukułka, *Teoria stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warszawa 2000, p. 252–253. Science should be understood as “a set of activities that lead to gathering a scientifically substantiated store of knowledge about the reality (science in the pragmatic sense) or a set of opinions formed thereof (science in the apragmatic sense).” See also: A. Redelbach, *Wstęp do prawoznawstwa*, Poznań 1996, p. 12–14; and a different outlook on science: L. Wolpert, *Nienaturalna natura nauki. Dlaczego nauka jest pozabawiona zdrowego rozsądku*, Gdańsk 1996.

⁴ J. Kukułka, op. cit., p. 253. For more information about other methods and techniques of forecasting, see: K. J. Stryjski, *Prognozowanie...*, op. cit.

⁵ K. Borodako, *Foresight w zarządzaniu strategicznym*, Warszawa 2009, p. 84.

training troops as well as a helpful tool for making political and economic decisions.⁶

The scenario analysis method involves describing events and identifying their logical and consistent consequences in order to determine how, step by step, an object such as society, economy, energy industry, and environmental protection will develop. At the same time, a starting point is chosen, which can be, for example, a current or any other state of affairs. Under scenario analysis, the end result of the research and forecasting is any number of possible projections about the future. Only variants which are likely to happen in the future are considered: those that are relevant to the object which the scenario is prepared for, strictly referring to the time chosen for the forecast, and those that remain in conjunction with each other through various types of relationships (cause and effect, formal and legal, time sequence). Scenarios used in this method of forecasting should contain information that says what hypothetical events may occur step by step and that constitutes variants constructed for each event, occurring at every stage of the projected future, that can foster a trend or reverse/prevent a tendency that makes the forecasted event unsafe or undesirable for the international community. Scenarios can be constructed with the use of many methods. The choice of method depends on the type of test object and the nature of the research process⁷.

Scenario construction is based on certain principles and includes the following consecutive tasks:

1. Definition of an object, or a determination of its elements, compounds, and convergences between them and a definition of the scope of a scenario. At this stage, it is necessary to collect as many data about the object under consideration as possible. Phenomena that will be included in the scenario and variables characterising the chosen phenomena with reference to the relations between them should also be identified. In this phase of constructing the scenario, the original set of variables is reduced, because usually it also includes those that are less relevant to the aim of the forecast. The interrelationship of data is described by definitions. It can be done when one variable is the sum or difference, quotient or product of other variables, or in any other descriptive form relevant to political, social or cultural phenomena. The result of the first stage is a model of the inside of the object of study.

⁶ M. Sulek, *Metody i techniki badań stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warszawa 2004, p. 136.

⁷ K. J. Stryjski, *Prognozowanie...*, op. cit., p. 74–75.

2. Identification and description of phenomena belonging to the environment of the object of study (international environment of a subject of international relations), or an identification of the so-called areas of influence that have a serious impact on the development of the object of study. At this stage, we define the nature and extent of the relationships between variables of areas of internal and external influence.
3. Quantitative documentation of the relationships between the elements of the object and between the object of study and its external environment.
4. Preparation of forecasts of the variables of the object in the environment significantly affecting the object of study.
5. Development of a pre-scenario is based on preparing a forecast of the variables of the object. They are used to create a multivariate description of the development of the object and analyse in detail all possibilities that may occur in a certain future.
6. Identification of factors affecting the development process of the object. The object of study (under forecast) is a dynamic element present in the international reality. It refers to both a subject of international relations and phenomena or processes. Therefore, we must reckon with confounding factors affecting the object in a positive and negative way. A confounding event is an event that occurs suddenly, but is not a disaster. In the process of creating the scenario, the impact of such events on the development of the object is assessed and counter- (where the object of study is affected in a negative way) or adaptive factors are determined (where the object of study is affected in a positive way).
7. Preparation of a script which will be a concise description of the state and development of the object of study in a certain future, taking into account the quantitative and qualitative changes occurring in both the object and its environment, including the factors confounding the development process of the object and their consequences.⁸

On 12 December 2012, the first session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, elected the month before, was held. The following parties were constituted: Party of Regions (210 MPs, of whom 25 elected as independent deputies), All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" (99 to 101, two deputies did not joined the party), UDAR (42, including two independents), All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" (37), and Communist Party of Ukraine (32). 24 MPs remained outside the parties, elected as independents. V. Rybak, one of the

⁸ Ibidem, p. 77–78.

founders of the Party of Regions, became the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada. He enjoys great authority in his party, but remains outside the competing groups of influence within the party. I. Kaletnyk from the Communist Party and R. Koshulinsky from the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" were elected as Rybak's deputies. The Verkhovna Rada also agreed to reappoint M. Azarov as prime minister (by a majority of 252 votes: the Party of Regions, the Communists, and 12 independent deputies).⁹

The political system of modern Ukraine, roughly speaking, can be described as a system of strong presidency, strong state centralisation, and very extensive administration (especially presidential). The current situation is linked to the fact that on 1 October 2010, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court repealed a law of 8 December 2004 which introduced a constitutional amendment changing the system of government from a presidential-parliamentary to a parliamentary-presidential one. The Court decreed that it had been introduced in violation of the constitution. As a consequence, the Court adjudicated that as of the moment of the ruling, the version of the constitution from 1996 was once again valid. There is no doubt that the Constitutional Court's ruling was made in the interest of (if not under pressure from) President V. Yanukovich. The ruling restores the president's superiority in the political system, as it weakens the government and parliament alike.¹⁰

The process of formation of the Ukrainian political system is not complete. Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe is a complex process involving changes in the political, economic, and socio-cultural spheres. Often-and whether rightly so is another debate-it is assumed that these countries strengthen/seek liberal democracy. Public opinion polls and analyses prepared by such institutions as the CBOS, Eurobarometer, "The

⁹ T. A. Olszański, *Inauguracja Rady Najwyższej Ukrainy nowej kadencji*, www.osw.waw.pl (29.12.2012). For more information about the 2012 parliamentary elections and the future of Ukraine, see: T. A. Olszański, *Przed wyborami parlamentarnymi na Ukrainie*, www.osw.waw.pl (29.12.2012); T. Iwański, *Media i wolność słowa na Ukrainie przed wyborami parlamentarnymi*, www.osw.waw.pl (29.12.2012); E. Тейзе, *Украина после выборов: малоутешительные прогнозы немецких политологов*, по материалам Deutsche Welle, <http://news.finance.ua> (29.12.2012); *Прогноз: Будущее Украины-России к 2020 году*, <http://poslezavtra.com.ua> (29.12.2012).

¹⁰ T. A. Olszański, *Sąd Konstytucyjny przywraca system prezydencki na Ukrainie*, www.osw.waw.pl (29.12.2012). See also: *Współczesna Ukraina*, edited by Ł. Donaj, A. Romaniuk, Łódź 2007.

Economist”, and Freedom House are helpful in tracking trends in democratisation in states¹¹.

The Democracy Index is an index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit that measures the state of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 165 are United Nations member states. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index is based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political culture. The Index was first produced in 2006, with updated lists produced in 2008, 2010, and 2011. The countries are categorised into *full democracies*, *flawed democracies*, *hybrid regimes*, and *authoritarian regimes*.¹² In 2010, Ukraine secured 67th place (still as a flawed democracy), but a year later, 79th place (and therefore as a hybrid regime). In comparison, Russia from 107th in 2010 (a hybrid regime) dropped to 117th place (an authoritarian regime).¹³

It is, at this point, with the aid of Freedom House’s terminology, worth noting that hybrid regimes cover a wide spectrum, from *flawed democracies* to *competitive authoritarian regimes*, or regimes that stabilise power through the introduction of elections and other democratic elements of political practice. Hybrid regimes usually promise democracy and a state under the rule of law, which, however, local governance practice continually disavows:

1. Elections, due to the manipulation of the ruling, are open to sufficient political competition only to a limited extent.
2. The government controls much of the media, uses public finance for party funding, favours some groups, and load the dice against others.
3. Although the parliament can be elected in free elections, the government intervenes in the legislature by issuing decrees.
4. The courts are formally independent, but in reality they are controlled, harassed, and dominated by the executive.
5. Although the parliament elects the government, players of the political game who do not have a democratic mandate such as the army, reli-

¹¹ See: Ł. Donaj, *Ukraina 2010 – “wadliwej demokracji” ciąg dalszy*, “ATHE-NAEUM. Polskie Studia Politologiczne” 2011, No. 27.

¹² See: www.eiu.com/democracyindex2011 (29.12.2012); http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf (29.12.2012); http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/EIU_Democracy_Index_Dec2011.pdf (29.12.2012); www.eiu.com (29.12.2012).

¹³ See: http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf (29.12.2012); http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/EIU_Democracy_Index_Dec2011.pdf (29.12.2012).

gious leaders, oligarchs, or businesses make claims to control certain areas of public life.¹⁴

All the above elements, to a varying degree, match the situation in Ukraine. With regard to the last, particular attention should be paid to the notion that sometimes is applied to Ukraine, that is, *oligarchic democracy*. The Ukrainian oligarchic system, which developed into its ultimate shape during L. Kuchma's presidency (1994–2004), though subject to some evolution, proved to be durable. The mid-1990s saw the establishment of oligarchic groups that after a few years acquired a dominant influence on the political life of the state. After the Orange Revolution, there have been reshuffles among the oligarchs, however, no change in the system. The representatives of big business have retained a decisive influence on the politics and economy of Ukraine. Big business in Ukraine not only controls all sectors of the economy and the mass media, but also has a huge influence within political parties. Often, the overriding goal of the existence of a given group is to represent the interests of the oligarchs sponsoring it. There is a network of connections between politicians and oligarchs. In some cases, they are so strong that it is fair to say that oligarchic groups have been formed (businessmen, politicians, and state officials supporting each other). The big business representatives in Ukraine are often more important actors in the political arena than the politicians themselves. When giving their support for a given political grouping, the representatives of big business are guided by nothing more than their own interests, and they do not identify themselves with the views of the political parties and politicians to whom they offer financial support. If the political configuration changes, the oligarchs usually have no problems finding common ground with the new government.¹⁵

Some observers of the Ukrainian political scene due to the strengthening of the “family” see a risk of Ukraine’s “Putinisation”,¹⁶ but it does not seem real. Although it is possible that the authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine will increase and the “family” will certainly continue to strengthen, it seems unlikely that in the next few years Yanukovich will manage to have all the major business groups well in hand. The situation

¹⁴ W. Merkel, *Koniec euforii. Czy w XXI wieku świat będzie bardziej demokratyczny? Nie za bardzo*, “Internationale Polityk”, 26.05.2010, “Forum”, 5–11.07.2010.

¹⁵ S. Matuszak, *Demokracja oligarchiczna. Wpływ grup biznesowych na ukraińską politykę*, “Prace OSW – 42”, www.osw.waw.pl (28.12.2012).

¹⁶ Т. Кузьо, *Украине грозит путинизация СБУ, МВД и информационной политики*, UNIAN, 25.06.2010, www.unian.net, in: ibidem.

in Ukraine in the past two years has resembled Russia's after Putin came to power, but there are some fundamental differences. First of all, Yanukovich has limited backup. Putin used former officers of the KGB for backup, while the Ukrainian president reaches out to his friends from Yenakieve and his son's, Oleksandr's, most of whom have limited powers to govern the state. It also is doubtful that the new regime could overcome Ukrainian bureaucracy, because it is too corrupt and largely dependent on big business. No less important is that Yanukovich cannot offer the Ukrainian society any ideology, and the popularity gained by slogans of stability and order declined drastically after only a few months of his reign.

Although in the future reshuffles are possible (and will probably take place), the chances of change in the nature of relations between the government and big business are slim, at least in the medium term. Even if, in 2015, Yanukovich loses power, there seem to be no politicians among his potential current opposition successors able to make such radical changes. In addition, the experiences after the Orange Revolution show that politicians who come to power under the banner of system change very quickly become a part of it.¹⁷

After regaining independence, Ukraine-in the context of international policy, or the environment of the object of study-had three options for shaping its policies. The first, referred to as the *doctrine of Dmytro Pavlychko*, predicted that Ukraine would remain a neutral and nonblock status state. The second enhanced the choice of the "Western option" and as a consequence, the state's inclusion in Euro-Atlantic structures. The third option talked about return to the Russian sphere of influence.¹⁸ Despite brief flirtations with the Euro-Atlantic and Russian options, it seems that the prevailing trend in the recent Ukrainian history has been and will be the multivector policy.¹⁹ The thesis is supported by the decisions by President Yanukovich, who, after having being elected as president, as first visited Brussels and Moscow, setting out two priority directions in foreign policy. His goal is to return to the multivector policy (*de facto* dual-vector policy) from the time of L. Kuchma, involving balancing the

¹⁷ S. Matuszak, *Demokracja oligarchiczna...*, op. cit.

¹⁸ Ł. Donaj, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa niepodległej Ukrainy 1991–2004*, Łódź 2005, p. 176.

¹⁹ See also: Ł. Donaj, *GUUAM jako przykład wielowektorowości w ukraińskiej polityce*, in: *Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia w procesie globalizacji i integracji*, edited by T. Wallas, Słubice 2003.

influences of Russia and the West, and deriving benefits from both sides. Today, it is much more difficult, however, due to the weakening of Ukraine after the economic and political crisis.²⁰ In addition, it is impossible not to notice other international actors such as China, more and more active on the post-Soviet territories.²¹

For a well-painted scenario of the development of the political situation in Ukraine, forecasts of the variables in the environment of the object of study (i.e., the European Union's, the Russian Federation's, China's, Poland's, etc.) should be prepared too. But this task goes beyond the capabilities of a journal article written by a single author. However, in all likelihood, it can be assumed on one hand, that, due to the global recession, these actors will deal primarily with their own problems²² and on the other, that, a Ukraine paradoxically drifting towards authoritarianism may be an easier, that is, more predictable, business partner than a country mired in transformation chaos.

At the same time, the election results have put an end to one of the Party of Regions' main objectives, which was to create a majority of 300 votes in parliament with the independent deputies; this would have enabled it to change the constitution, including the introduction of elections for president in parliament.²³ However, it is worth looking at one of the factors that may confound (accelerate) the development of the object. This might be a bill on national referendums, signed in November 2012, which allows laws to be made without any involvement by the parliament. There is no provision for the parliament to take part in either the preparation of the referendum or the implementation of its results. To have a referendum called, it will be enough

²⁰ S. Matuszak, *Janukowycz balansuje między Brukselą a Moskwą*, www.osw.waw.pl (29.12.2012).

²¹ See more: S. Matuszak, *Janukowycz w Chinach – trzeci wektor w ukraińskiej polityce zagranicznej?*, www.osw.waw.pl (29.12.2012).

²² See: R. Woś, *Trzy scenariusze dla strefy euro. Powrót walut narodowych, rozpad czy narodziny superpaństwa?*, "Dziennik Gazeta Prawna" 28–30.05.2010; *Goodbye dollar!*, based on: "Wirtschaftswoche", "Forum" 20.07.2009; N. Ferguson, *Kiedy zielony robi się czerwony*, "The Daily Telegraph" 1.06.2009, "Forum" 20.07.2009; U. Schäfer, *Wielka recesja będzie większa*, "Süddeutsche Zeitung" 24.06.2009, www.tygodnikforum.pl (8.08.2012); *Prognozy dla gospodarki na najbliższą dekadę. Eksperti Financial Timesa o trendach, jakie w niedalekiej przyszłości będą miały największy wpływ na rozwój światowego biznesu*, "Dziennik Gazeta Prawna" 12–14.03.2010.

²³ T. A. Olszański, *Po wyborach parlamentarnych na Ukrainie: trudne zwycięstwo Partii Regionów*, www.osw.waw.pl (29.12.2012).

for an organising committee to gather three million signatures; the referendum's results will be valid regardless of the turnout, and will come into force directly (the president cannot refuse to sign legislation which has been approved in a referendum). Referendums can be used to enact and repeal laws, and to adopt a new constitution (although the current revision of the constitution preserves the existing parliamentary procedure). Projects for such laws (including the constitution) will be presented by organising committees. Referendums may also be used to resolve political issues such as consent to the free buying and selling of agricultural land, the status of the Russian language, or the concepts and terms of international cooperation. The new referendum act significantly changes the constitutional system of Ukraine, limiting the role of parliament in favour of the executive and extra-constitutional structures, and introducing a new procedure for making laws. The act also subjugates the principle of representative democracy to that of direct democracy, for example in stating that a referendum is "a way for Ukrainian citizens to take decisions of national importance." It is expected that the law will be challenged in the Constitutional Court, although it is doubtful whether the Court will rule it to be incompatible with the provisions of the Basic Law. The opposition has attacked the project, pointing out that political parties (that is, the opposition parties) will thus be deprived of influence on the organisation of referendums; and claiming that the main reason for the law's adoption is the intention to have the president elected by popular vote, instead of by parliament (with regard to Yanukovych's poor chances of being re-elected in a general election). Importantly, because of the requirements concerning the collection of signatures to hold a referendum (three million signatures are necessary, which must come from no fewer than two-thirds of Ukraine's regions, with not less than 100,000 signatures from each), it would be extremely difficult for the opposition to organise the calling of a referendum. Indeed, the passage of referendum law as described has already reduced democratic standards in Ukraine, and will contribute to the strengthening of the authoritarian and populist tendencies in its government. The plan moves Ukraine away from the solutions adopted in the EU's member states. The possible introduction via referendums of important legislation, not to mention a new constitution, will be a significant obstacle in the process of rapprochement between Ukraine and the European Union.²⁴

²⁴ T. A. Olszański, *Ustawa o referendum zagrożeniem dla ukraińskiej demokracji*, www.osw.waw.pl (29.12.2012).

Thus, with the passive support of some external actors (such as the EU, the USA) and the active one, or at least the “benevolent” (if the created scenario is evaluated²⁵) encouragement of the erosion of democracy by others (Russia), given the trends inside Ukraine, it can be stated that the country in the coming years will be-or rather is already-on a downward spiral, tending towards authoritarian regimes or at least “strengthening” against other hybrid regimes.

As rightly noted by Stryjski, forecasting social phenomena can in many ways be difficult. The reason is that it is the nature of these phenomena to be closely and multilaterally linked with physical, biological, and other social phenomena. Thus, making judgements about the future course of social phenomena, which, unlike physical phenomena based on “strong” science, are dependent on a large number of factors with varying degrees of stability is a complex task. It should also be added that it is rarely possible to carry out experiments in a social phenomenon. All this makes the basis for predicting the future course of social phenomena weak – in this case, the forecast itself is a social phenomenon that together with others may influence forecasting in various ways.²⁶

Among others, the prediction of social phenomena (in a global sense) is hindered (limited) by:

1. *Qualitative character of social science laws* (formulated at a high degree of generality);

²⁵ A prediction scenario can be either: 1 *Explanatory*, in this scenario, a set of events treated as main hypotheses is painted, the relationship between the events is explanatory, the scenario is developed in the forward direction of time; 2 *Anticipatory*, in both scenarios, a whole events considered potential (possible) are painted, with the difference that in the latter, the relationships and dependencies that occur between the events described are desired end states (with the distinction between possible and desired events and end states), the scenario is developed in the backward direction of time. In addition, scenarios can be: 1 *Prescriptive*, only an ordered set of events is painted without a specific diagnosis whether an event is desirable or not for the recipient; the forecaster in this case maintains an impartial and competent attitude towards the object of study. The effect of this method of study of future events is a realistic scenario. In addition, a hypothetical scenario can be constructed, serving as a basis for decision-making; 2 *Normative*, this kind of scenario is dealt with when the “goals and interests of the customer are explicitly taken into account” by the person preparing the forecast. In this type of scenario, both positive and negative effects of the events described are taken into account. K. J. Stryjski, *Prognozowanie...*, op. cit., p. 75–76.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 30–31.

2. *Oedipus effect* – predicting triggers action that accelerates the predicted effect;
3. *Syndromatic nature of social phenomena* – phenomena that we study occur in certain wholes, often heterogeneous. Man and his behaviour as the object of study is a bio-psycho-socio-cultural being, so his behaviour is guided by genes, brain, and education (culture). The premise of predictions have to be laws of different nature such as anthropology, psychology, sociology, and philosophy;
4. *Evolving nature of social reality* – the reality we live in is changing radically. The demands of history require that new general knowledge be complemented by new information about new epochs. Therefore, general knowledge has little relevance, in itself it must be saturated with new information. Consequently, in order to continue to predict, new concrete historical knowledge must be taken into account.²⁷

As indicated by Sarjusz-Wolski, the mechanism to predict the future is to know and match past events, relevant to the object of forecasting, and the regularities between them (type and strength of the cause and effect relationships), and to draw conclusions about the occurrence (or nonoccurrence) of particular future events. The mechanism of prediction can be illustrated by the following simple example. Let us say that we have reached a deep wide river and want to cross it dry-shod, but there is no bridge. We know, however, that a boat would allow us to do it (regularity: if boat, then boating on the water). By serendipity, we have just discovered one in the nearby bushes (cognition of reality). Based on these premises, we can already predict that soon we should be on the other side. However, if our information about the boat was not complete, that is, if, for example, we did not know that it was leaking and taking on water, most likely our predictions would prove incorrect. As a result, we would “end up” somewhere else than expected.²⁸ Predicting social phenomena or their development shows (see evolving nature of social reality) that the problem is not only the boat. The problem is also that we do not know if the opposite bank of the river exists.

²⁷ Materials about forecasting made available by M. Solak, in Author's possession. See also: M. Karwat, *Syndromatyczny charakter przedmiotu nauki o polityce*, in: *Demokratyczna Polska w globalizującym się świecie – I Ogólnopolski Kongres Politologii, Warszawa 22–24.09.2009*, edited by K. A. Wojtaszczyk, A. Mirska, Warszawa 2009, p. 175–188.

²⁸ Z. Sarjusz-Wolski, *Skutki przelotu motyla nad Szanghajem*, “Unia@Polska. Niezależny magazyn europejski” 2005, No. 7/8 (122–123), p. 54.

Taking into account the above-mentioned problems of forecasting, it is time to draw conclusions on Ukraine. As noted by Kałan, the words *crisis* and *Ukraine* are slowly becoming synonymous.²⁹ In this context, one is led to wonder whether the crises in Ukraine are primarily the consequence of phenomena that in democracies change in a cyclical manner³⁰ (i.e., elections) and are just “inscribed” in its existence. Or, on the assumption that crisis (not crises) is chronological, should it also be not recognised, along the lines of Kondratiev’s theory of the economic and political cycles,³¹ that Ukraine after each postcrisis phase, emerging “unscathed”, rises to a new, higher level? Then, assuming linearity (which, incidentally, may limit the futurologist), prediction of the development of the internal and external situation of Ukraine may be easier. However, this only simplifies the reality. One problem is that one cannot prepare accurate forecasts of variables of areas of internal and external influence. Another is, assuming that Kondratev’s theory is correct, determining the place of Ukraine – in other words, the answer to the question, “Are we still falling or are we already at the bottom?”

It seems, therefore, that we can only indicate the main development trends of the Ukrainian state, leaving the details to the future. This does

²⁹ D. Kałan, *Wybory w czasach zarazy*, at: www.psz.pl (29.01.2010).

³⁰ Politics comes with the economy. Therefore, it seems appropriate to refer to the concept of the political business cycle. According to it, politicians influencing the course of economic processes are a factor that reinforces rather than breaks the business cycle. In their activities, they are motivated by a need to win elections and stay in power. When we add to that the emotional nature of the elections, one can get the impression that most politicians find crises essential to win next election. The question is whether this is also of benefit to the voter. Furthermore, with regard to Ukraine one could-although such things happen in well-established democracies as well-raise an objection of lack of cyclical elections (see the early parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2007, the issue of the presidential election in 2004 and further one in 2010, which was originally to have been held on 25 October 2009). See also: *Dylematy teorii ekonomii w rzeczywistości gospodarczej XXI wieku*, edited by A. Balcerzak, D. Górecka, Toruń 2007; *Teoria ekonomii*, t. 2: *Makroekonomia*, edited by K. Meredyk, Białystok 2000; *Верховна Рада призначила вибори Президента на 25 жовтня*, www.unian.net (29.01.2010); *Czechy. Polska. Ukraina. Partie i systemy partyjne. Stan i perspektywy*, edited by K. Kowalczyk, Ł. Tomczak, Toruń 2007.

³¹ There is no shortage of skeptics, of course, of such an approach, e.g.: Murray Rothbard. See: *Encyklopedia politologii*, edited by M. Żmigrodzki, t. 5: *Stosunki międzynarodowe*, edited by T. Łoś-Nowak, Kraków 2002, entry: *Cykle rozwojowe* (Author: T. Łoś-Nowak), p. 66–67; M. Rothbard, *Cykl Kondratiewa – Fakt czy oszustwo?*, translate J. Jabłecki, <http://mises.pl> (29.01.2010).

not mean that futurology should be “crossed out.” If nothing else, it is needed to “practice” all scenarios, even ones that in Ukraine seem unrealistic. Only then will we be “prepared for the unknown.” May it be so.

Ukraine after the parliamentary elections of 2012: selected scenarios of the development of the political situation

Summary

The twenty or so years of Ukrainian sovereignty is definitely too short a period to facilitate fully justified hypotheses concerning the development of both the domestic and international situation of Ukraine, but it does make it possible to make some conjectures. This paper presents a scenario for the development of Ukraine’s political situation which, in the author’s opinion, will take place, or is actually in progress, following the 2012 parliamentary elections. This simplified scenario has been designed employing a forecasting method named the international scenario method. Taking into consideration that forecasting social phenomena tends to be difficult in many respects (which is a consequence of their strong and multifarious relations not only with other social, but also physical and biological, phenomena) the paper refers to selected forecasting issues, in particular those related to the international scenario method, which is then applied to the political situation of Ukraine. In the author’s opinion, in the years to come Ukraine will continue to degenerate towards authoritarian regimes, or will ‘strengthen’ its status as a hybrid regime.

Ukraina po wyborach parlamentarnych 2012 roku – wybrane scenariusze rozwoju sytuacji politycznej

Streszczenie

Dwadzieścia kilka lat niepodległej Ukrainy to stanowczo za mało, by móc w pełni rzetelnie stawiać hipotezy odnośnie rozwoju sytuacji wewnętrznej i zewnętrznej tego państwa, niemniej jednak, już to pozwala nam snuć pewne przypuszczenia. W artykule przedstawiona jest wizja rozwoju sytuacji politycznej na Ukrainie, jaka zdaniem autora nastąpi – a raczej już następuje – po wyborach parlamentarnych z 2012. Owa – uproszczona – wizja skonstruowana jest w oparciu o jedną z metod prognozowania, zwaną metodą scenariusza międzynarodowego. Biorąc pod uwagę fakt, że prognozowanie zjawisk społecznych bywa pod wieloma względami utrudnione (co wynika m.in. z tego, że w naturze tych zjawisk tkwi silne i wielostronne powiązanie z innymi zjawiskami społecznymi; ale nie tylko – także fizycznymi czy biologicznymi) w artykule przywołano wybrane problemy prognozowania, zwłaszcza te związane z metodą scenariusza międzynarodowego, następnie odniesiono ową metodę do sytuacji politycznej na Ukrainie.

Zdaniem Autora Ukraina w kolejnych latach znajdzie się – a raczej już się znajduje – na równi pochyłej, staczając się w stronę reżimów autorytarnych, lub przynajmniej “umacniając się” wśród reżimów hybrydowych.